How human traffickers transformed the Bangladesh–Libya–Italy route into one of the world’s most profitable migration corridors
Originally published on Global Voices
Boats with refugees are arriving at the beaches of Skala Sykamia, Lesvos Island, Greece. Image via Wikimedia Commons by Ggia (CC BY-SA 4.0).
After three years of construction work in Dhaka, Ishmam, 28, from Shariatpur, Bangladesh, had accumulated about USD 6,500 in savings when the dalal (local broker) approached him with a proposition that seemed almost too good to refuse. The route appeared straightforward: Bangladesh through Saudi Arabia to Libya, then a brief Mediterranean crossing to Italian shores, where monthly earnings could exceed what he made annually.
“From Bangladesh through Saudi Arabia to Libya, then from Libya attempting the boat crossing to Greece or Italy,” he recounted months later, describing what he believed would be a well-established pathway used by thousands before him.
However, upon reaching Libya, reality shifted dramatically. He spent three weeks in what smugglers called a “game house” — a holding facility where some 200 migrants waited for favorable weather conditions and boat availability.
The promised boat finally arrived at night, overcrowded beyond any safe margin, with nearly 150 people packed into a vessel designed for perhaps 40.
“We went with the hope of reaching Italy for a better future,” he said, remembering the moment the engine started and the Libyan coast began receding. “The boat traveled for only 20 minutes before the coast guard caught us.”
Ishmam is one of many Bangladeshis who set out in pursuit of the European dream, only to discover it was far different from what smugglers had promised. After returning to Bangladesh in May 2026, he shared his experience with a research team that included the author as part of a migration research project.
Another returnee’s experience revealed an even darker dimension of this system. “The migrant facilitators in Libya are Bangladeshis themselves. Billions of dollars are leaving our country and flowing to Libya into this network,” he revealed. The dalal who recruited him in Bangladesh maintained daily contact throughout the journey, not for welfare checks but to coordinate payment demands with Libyan handlers.
“My dalal took USD 12,915 from me to take me successfully to a European country, and now I have returned like an offender,” he stated. His detention lasted 23 days, a deliberate degradation designed to pressure the family to pay a ransom.
These two cases shine a light on a smuggling network that has turned the Bangladesh-Libya-Italy corridor into one of the world’s most lucrative irregular migration markets.
Irregular migration through the Central Mediterranean
Around 15,228 Bangladeshi migrants arrived in Italy via the Central Mediterranean Route in 2022, making Bangladesh the third most-represented nationality in terms of irregular migration. This figure represented a stark increase from just 349 arrivals in 2018.
Approximately 14,000 Bangladeshis reached Italy through this route in 2024. Between June 2023 and August 2025, nearly 6,000 Bangladeshi nationals were repatriated from Libya with assistance from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), a branch of the United Nations.
This number grew to 8,174 by December 2025, with multiple repatriation flights carrying hundreds of migrants each month throughout 2024 and 2025.
The routes for migration have proliferated and been adapted to enforcement measures. The primary pathway flows from Bangladesh through Dubai to Egypt and finally Benghazi, though 50 percent of undocumented Bangladeshi migrants now enter Libya through Turkey.
An alternative route through India and Sri Lanka is activated when the Dhaka airport authorities increase scrutiny. Other transit countries include Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan, Turkey, Tunisia, and the UAE — creating a complex network that shifts and adapts to enforcement pressures.
Comparing legal and irregular migration costs
The economics of this system reveal why recruitment networks find irregular migration so lucrative. In 2020, the average legal migration cost for Bangladeshi workers, including airfare, visa costs, and agent fees, was USD 3,520 for Saudi Arabia and between USD 2,420 and USD 3,230 for Oman, Qatar, and Malaysia. These costs have risen, with the average migration cost now exceeding USD 3,730, as of December 2025.
A male worker now spends USD 4,035 to USD 7,265 to reach Saudi Arabia, while migration to Malaysia costs USD 2,825 to USD 4,845. The government officially set costs at USD 1,330 for Saudi Arabia, USD 1,290 for Malaysia, USD 870 for the UAE, USD 860 for Kuwait, USD 815 for Oman, and USD 790 for Bahrain, but actual expenses run 2.5 to 2.6 times these amounts.
However, the Libya-Italy corridor operates on an entirely different scale. Travel from Bangladesh to Libya alone ranges from USD 4,500 to USD 4,900, while the Mediterranean crossing and migration to Europe costs between USD 3,000 and USD 4,000 per person.
Most Bangladeshis pay between USD 10,000 and USD 14,000 for the complete journey, with many ultimately spending USD 15,000 to USD 17,000 after extortion and additional costs inside Libya.
In Bangladesh, brokers collect initial fees of USD 4,035 to USD 12,915 for documentation and passage. Transit facilitators in Dubai, Egypt, Kuwait, Turkey, India, or Sri Lanka coordinate group movement and collect fees for each handover. Once in Libya, airport sponsors demand payments, armed groups extract “security fees,” drivers charge for internal transport, and coastal smugglers control Mediterranean access.
The game house system represents perhaps the most cynical extraction mechanism. “The game house operates just like a jail. You can’t talk; there is no means for communication. They keep 200–300 people together. Those whose money runs out get sent back; those whose money is not finished get left behind,” explained a migrant describing these pre-departure holding facilities where families receive continuous payment demands while their relatives wait for boat departures.
The ‘gold migrant’ phenomenon
Bangladeshi migrants are considered “gold” within Libya’s smuggling economy because they represent the most reliable source of payment. Behind every migrant stands a family that remains deeply involved throughout the journey — negotiating with brokers in Bangladesh, arranging financing, coordinating payments during transit, and liaising with smugglers whenever problems arise.
Researchers have estimated that the Bangladesh-Libya-Italy smuggling economy generates USD 160–190 million annually, using 2024’s baseline of 14,000 arrivals in Italy and applying documented price structures. This represents a lower-bound estimate, excluding those who paid but never arrived in Italy — migrants intercepted at sea, detained indefinitely in Libya, or who perished during crossing attempts.
The human resale market within Libya adds another layer of exploitation. Migrants entering legally by air are promised temporary work while waiting for their “next visa” to Italy. Upon arrival, their passports disappear under the pretext of processing paperwork. They work immediately in construction or service sectors but receive no payment. Eventually, they learn they’ve been “sold” to another employer or broker — demonstrating a market where migrants function as tradable assets.
Bangladesh’s contribution to migrants smuggling market. Infographic by the author. Used with permission.
A quarter-billion-dollar future?
The trajectory suggests continued acceleration. Bangladeshis ranked first among asylum applicants in Italy, with 23,450 requests recorded in 2023. The trend had intensified further, with 2,589 Bangladeshis landing on Italian shores during January and February 2025 alone — double the 1,206 who arrived during the same period in 2024.
So why is this shadowy, dangerous industry so successful? First, legal migration costs continue rising. The expenses for low-skilled overseas job seekers to major destinations now range from USD 3,230 to USD 8,070. It takes at least 10 months of work to recover migration costs, forcing workers to accept lower wages while limiting their ability to negotiate.
Second, Gulf countries have tightened recruitment opportunities and imposed migration restrictions, pushing would-be migrants toward alternative destinations and illegal pathways. Research published in 2024 documents how brutal working conditions, combined with restrictive government policies toward migrant workers, lead some to reroute their “Dubai Dream” to Europe.
If the current growth rate of illegal migration continues — from approximately 14,000 arrivals in 2024 to an estimated 20,000 in 2025 — and if per-person costs remain between USD 10,000 and USD 17,000, the smuggling economy could reach USD 200 million to USD 340 million in gross revenue.
Even accounting for interceptions, failed attempts, and returnees, a conservative projection suggests the market could exceed USD 250 million annually by 2026, cementing its position as one of the world’s largest irregular migration corridors.
Unless Bangladesh establishes genuinely accessible legal migration pathways, thousands more will calculate that risking USD 12,915 for a twenty-minute boat ride represents their best chance at the life they’ve been promised.
